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Privacy and the Press: The Convergence of
British and French Law in Accordance With
the European Convention of Human Rights
Kathryn F. Deringer*
I. Introduction
The death of Great Britain's Princess Diana in a Paris tunnel in
1997 focused the world on British and French laws regarding the papa-
razzi, freedom of the press, and a celebrity's right to privacy. In particu-
lar, Great Britain responded by formally adopting The European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(hereinafter the "European Convention"), specifically Articles Eight and
Ten, which provide for a right to privacy and freedom of expression.1
The European Convention was signed by Great Britain in 1953, but Brit-
ain did not codify the rights embraced in the European Convention until
it enacted the Human Rights Act of 1998.2 France, which had long rec-
ognized a strong right to privacy both domestically in its case law and
through the European Convention, to which France was a signatory in
1953 but did not incorporate formally until 1970, also responded by
amending its laws and jurisdprudence regarding privacy and freedom of
the press to a more balanced approach.3
By comparing British and French jurisprudence regarding a right to
privacy, especially for celebrities, and freedom of the press, it is possible
to see the recent convergence of two extremely different legal ap-
proaches. Each country's incorporation of the European Convention, al-
though highly different, has heavily impacted the way each country deals
* J.D. Candidate, Dickinson School of Law, 2004; B.A., James Madison Univer-
sity, 2001. I would like to thank my family and my fiance, Greg, for their unending love
and encouragement.
1. See discussion infra Part hI.D.
2. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11,
entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20, 1971, Jan. 1, 1990, Nov. 1, 1998, art. 8, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter the European Convention].
3. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B, III.C.
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with issues regarding celebrities and the paparazzi.4
While France began with a strong right to privacy, formed through
its case law and legislation, the incorporation of the European Conven-
tion has caused France to lessen the severity of that right and afford more
protection to the freedom of expression. Great Britain went through a
similar evolution, albeit much more quickly, when it adopted the Euro-
pean Convention. Great Britain went from not even recognizing a right
to privacy, especially when dealing with situations where individuals
sought to protect themselves from the press, to balancing the freedom of
the press against one's right to privacy, in large part due to the incorpora-
tion of the European Convention.
In order to best understand these recent developments, it is neces-
sary to look at each country's history regarding the right to privacy.
Next, the discussion must turn to the European Convention and how each
country adopted its provisions regarding the right to privacy and freedom
of expression. 5 By comparing those respective histories and incorpora-
tions, one can see how two countries with very different legal traditions
regarding privacy and the press have come together, following the lead
of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the "ECHR") under
the European Convention, to balance the right to privacy and freedom of
the press in a similar way.
II. Right to Privacy
A. Origin of the Right to Privacy in France
France has had a long history with the concept of a right to privacy.
France first recognized such a right in its 1868 press law, coining the
phrase "la vie privee," or the "right to privacy.', 6 In actuality, French
judges created the right in an attempt to oppose the publication of private
facts.7 Although France is a civil law country, whereby all law is derived
from statutes and not the courts, the development of privacy rights did
not follow such a scheme. 8 Because there was no legislative guidance as
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. Id.
6. 6.See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 * 1890). In this scholarly article, which first introduced the idea of recognizing
a "right to be let alone" in America, Warren and Brandeis noted that France had long rec-
ognized a right to privacy, as evidenced by the 1868 press law.
7. See Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & bran-
dies Tort is Alive and Well and Flourishing in Paris, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1219, 1228 (1994).
8. Id. In noting that France deviated from the civil law system, Hauch stated:
The development of privacy rights in France was a remarkably "uncivil" proc-
ess in the sense that, without benefit of any legislative guidance on the subject,
French judges essentially created the right to oppose the publication of private
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to how the courts could oppose publication of private material, the courts
essentially used duty-based tort principles to create the right to oppose
publication of private matters. 9
The right to privacy in France is recognized as one of a bundle of
rights included in what many scholars label "personality rights." 10 These
rights include the right to privacy, the right to protect one's honor and
reputation, and the right to control the use of one's image. 1
As noted before, these personality rights, the most important of
which being the right to privacy, were initially determined through judi-
cial interpretations of French law, although they are now codified in
French legislation. 12 Many of the early cases that dealt with a right to
privacy focused on the damage to one's honor or reputation., 3 In decid-
ing these early cases, the courts applied tort liability principles from Ar-
ticle 1382 of the French Civil Code.'
4
The first case that applied duty-based tort principles to protect pri-
vacy interests was "the Rachel affair," decided in 1858.15 An artist drew
a picture of a famous actress, Rachel, on her deathbed and sold the draw-
ing despite her family's objections.' 6 The Tribunal de Premiere de la
Seine ordered that the drawing and any photographs of the drawing be
confiscated.' 7 The issue in the case revolved around whether the fam-
ily's right to privacy had been invaded. This Court held that "[n]o one
may, without the explicit consent of the family, reproduce and bring to
the public eye the image of an individual on her deathbed, whatever the
celebrity of the person involved.' 8 The decision rested on the idea that
the family had a right to privacy that must be protected and compensated
facts.
9. Id. At 1232, citing Roger Nerson, La protection de la vie privee en droit positif
francais, 23 Revue INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 737, 757 n.28 (1971)
("[B]y the consistency and regularity of their judgments, the courts have fashioned the
contours of a real right to the secrecy of private life.").
10. Id. at 1228.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 40 and 41. The amount of case law from the mid 1950s to early
1970s regarding the right to privacy was so much that it caused the Cour de cassation to
request legislative intervention. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1237.
For those unfamiliar with the French legal system, there are three levels of gen-
eral courts: the tribunaux de grande instance (trial courts); the cours d'appel (the courts of
appeals); and the Cour de cassation (High Court). The Cour de cassation's power is lim-
ited to setting aside judgments for errors of law. Id. at note 82.
13. Id. at 1237.
14. Code civil [C. civ.] art. 1382 (Fr.). Any person who performs an act that harms
another person must compensate the other for the harm caused by that act (translated in
Hauch, supra note 7, at 1231-32).
15. T.P.I. Seine, June 16, 1858, D.P. I1 1858, 52 [hereinafter The Rachel affair].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id., translated in Hauch, supra note 7, at 1233.
2003)
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
for when invaded.19
The court has extracted four basic principles from Article 1382
through that protect against the reproduction and publication of one's
image.20 First, it is irrelevant what medium is used to portray a person's
image." Second, courts have disallowed the unauthorized use of a per-
forming artist's fictitious name.22 Third, the person must be recognizable
when his or her image is reproduced.23 Fourth, and finally, consent must
be clearly expressed for the taking, reproduction and use of one's im-
age.24 Although the courts still use these principles in protecting privacy
interests, its decisions beginning in the mid 1950s expanded the right to
privacy beyond these general tort requirements.25
The first case many scholars believe recognized a right to privacy
19. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1235. Another early case recognizing a right to pri-
vacy involved a photographer who hung a picture of a child in his window with the con-
sent of the father but without the consent of the child's mother. See T.P.I. Portiers, Oct.
21, 1935, D.H. 1936, 45. Although the Court found that the photographer had the proper
authorization to hang the photo because the father was vested with parental authority over
the minor child, the Court nevertheless held that a right to privacy over one's image must
be recognized. "Only the photographed person may allow or deny the public exhibition
of his or her image. . for it may prejudice the freedom granted to each individual with
respect to his or her persona."
20. See Elisabeth Logeais and Jean-Baptiste Schroder, The French Right oflmage:
An Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 511,
519 (1998). This article articulates some of the key cases that the French courts have
used in the area of image reproduction, which is vital in the study of the history of the
fight to privacy in France. The following delineation of the interpretation of the French
Civil Code as to the right to privacy through the unauthorized use of one's image is in
large part disseminated from this leading article.
2 1. Id. Photographs, video game replications, and cartoon characters are all possible
subjects of court action. In one instance a court held that even the reproduction of one's
image in the form of a figurine invaded an individual's privacy. See CA Versailles, June
30, 1994, D. 1995, 645, note Ravanas.
22. It must meet certain requirements to be condemned as unusable without consent.
It must reflect his or her personality, and usually it must be unique and chosen by the per-
son, rather than a nickname given to him or her by others. See Cass. le civ., Feb. 19.
1975, Ann. 1977, 153 [hereinafter WS v. Jourdain].
In the case, a cabaret artist known as "Lova Moor" was allowed to prevent the
use of her fictitious name as the name of a women's clothing store. The court also held
that it did not matter if the name was only well known in the circle where the artist con-
ducts his or her activities.
23. It must be possible to identify the person whose image is being reproduced, and
if the person is an unknown, the image must be clear enough to establish undeniable iden-
tification. This concept was recognized in a notable suit against Robert Doisneau for his
famous photograph, "Kiss of the Hotel de Ville." T.G.I. Paris, le ch., June 2, 1993, Gaz.
Pal. 1994, 16 [hereinafter Epoux Lavergne v. R. Doisneau; and Francoise Bornet v. R.
Doisneau]. Two different women sued him, claiming to be the woman in the picture, and
requesting profits from the sale of the picture. The French court held that neither claim
was valid because neither woman's facial features were recognizable in the photograph.
24. See Logeais & Schroder, supra note 20, at n. 57. It is then within the court's
discretion to decide whether consent was given and to evaluate the scope of the consent.
25. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1237.
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without relying on tort principles was the Dietrich affair, decided in
1954.26 In the case, a weekly magazine, France-Dimanche, similar to
current American tabloids, published a series of articles entitled "My
Life, by Marlene Dietrich. 27  The articles were touted as Dietrich's
unpublished memoirs as told to a German journalist. 8 Although some of
the anecdotes involving Dietrich's personal life were true, the actress had
not authorized publication nor discussed such stories with any German
journalist.29 In affirming a judgment for Dietrich awarding damages for
unauthorized publication of private recollections, the Cour d'appel de
Paris held that no one may publish one's private recollections without his
or her consent.
30
The damages awarded to Dietrich were not limited to emotional dis-
tress based on tort principles, as they had been in the Rachel affair.
3'
The court included pecuniary damages as well, and awarded one of the
biggest damage awards ever given in a privacy case.32 The shift of the
court in awarding pecuniary damages for violations of privacy rights be-
gan the movement toward the creation of legislation protecting privacy
interests.
33
These decisions are of particular importance when focusing on the
34development of the right to privacy versus the freedom of the press.
The Rachel affair exemplified the disparity between the privacy right of
an individual and the right of the artist to freely express him or herself.
35
Although the right of authors to reproduce an image of an individual is
also one of the privileged "privacy rights," the cases following the Ra-
chel affair show that until recently, the French right to privacy often
trumped expressional and informational interests.36  Additionally, the
Dietrich affair is a perfect example of how the French courts put the pri-
vacy interests of an individual, in fact a celebrity, ahead of the interests
26. Judgment of Mar. 16, 1955, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1955 D.S.Jur. 295 (Fr.).
[hereinafter The Dietrich Affair].
27. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1237.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 1955 D.S.Jur. at 295 (translated in Hauch, supra note 7, at 1237-38). "[Tlhe
recollections of each individual concerning her private life are part of her moral property;
..no one may publish them, even without malicious intent, without the express and un-
equivocal authorization of the person whose life is recounted."
31. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1238.
32. Id. The court awarded damages of 1,200,000 francs, heavily relying on the fact
that Dietrich was in the process of preparing her own memoirs for publication.
33. See supra, note 12.
34. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1235. In the development of the right to privacy by
the judiciary in France, the courts consistently put privacy interests ahead of the rights of
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of free expression of the press. 37 The affinity of the courts to hold pri-
vacy interests over those of the press helped create the strong anti-
paparazzi tradition that was so notable in France prior to the recent de-
velopments created by international documents such as the European
38Convention.
B. French Legislation and Adoption of International Standards
1. French Legislation. - Following the flood of case law in the
1950s and 1960s, the French legislature finally recognized a specific
right to privacy in their statutory law.39 In the Law of July 17, 1970 the
French legislature gave the right to privacy specific protection by
introducing Article Nine into the French Civil Code and by providing for
offenses in the Penal Code.4°
Article Nine of the Civil Code gives the courts the power to order
drastic preliminary injunctions to prevent intrusions into one's private
life.4' It states that "everyone is entitled to respect of private life" and
gives judges the power to protect an individual's right to privacy with a
number of legal remedies.42
The French Criminal Code, in Article 226(1), punishes anyone who
purportedly invades one's private life by "fixing, recording or transmit-
ting, through any device, the image of a person in a private place, with-
out their consent" with a sentence of imprisonment of one year and a
fine.43 Under French law, both individuals and corporations may be
found guilty of violating this Article.44
The French Criminal Code also provides for the protection against
the publication of false stories or manipulated images of a person without
the person's consent. 45  Article L 226-8 criminalizes the printing of
knowingly false stories or manipulated images published without consent
whenever the false nature is not obvious or clearly indicated in the publi-
37. This is especially significant considering the fact that the information printed
was truthful.
38. See discussion infra, Part III.C.
39. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1233-36.
40. Law. No. 70-643 of July 17, 1970, J.O., July 19, 1970, p.67 5 1 (codified in C.
civ. Art. 9 (Fr.)).
41. C. civ. art. 9(1)-(2) (Fr.).
42. Id. Article 9(2) states:
"Judges can, without prejudice to the later reparation of any damages suffered,
prescribe all measures such as sequester, seizure and others, capable of avoid-
ing or ending a violation of the intimacy of private life [and] these measures
can given urgency, be ordered by one judge sitting in chambers."
43. Code penal (C. PEN.) art. 226(1) (Fr.).
44. Id.
45. C. PEN. art. 226(8).
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46cation. A plaintiff is required to establish two elements in order to pur-
sue a criminal action against someone under this article. A plaintiff must
show: (1) an intent to take or to disseminate the image, although a show-
ing of willful indiscretion is not required; and (2) that the image was
taken on private property.4 7
2. International Rules and Standards. - Since these early cases,
the French common law regarding privacy has been enhanced through
the addition of a variety of laws and treaties, and through the adoption of
many of the international standards and rules that have been established
to protect individuals' privacy and dignity. For example, the 1948
Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Human Being and the Citizen
states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks. 48 Additionally, Article Eight of the
European Convention states that "everyone has the right to have their
private and family life, home and mail respected. '49
The death of Princess Diana in a Paris tunnel in 1997 also prompted
a variety of legislation intended to curb the press and protect the privacy
of individuals. 50 Due to the increased public support of new restrictions
on the press, the European Parliament scheduled an "emergency debate"
on strengthening privacy laws.5 In addition, the European Parliament's
Culture and Media Committee sought to develop an international "code
of conduct" for the news media by asking the European Commission to
do a comparative study of existing legislation.52
French privacy law, created most "uncivilly" in the courts, incorpo-
rated through the European Convention, and codified in legislation, is
quite extensive. The French courts' forceful promotion of individual pri-
vacy interests versus the freedom of the press has been plainly evident in
46. Id.
47. C. PEN. art. 266(8).
48. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810
at 71, art. 12 (1948) ("Nul ne sera l'objet d'immixtions arbitraires dans sa vie privee, sa
famille, son domicile ou sa correspondance, ni d'attientes a son honneur ou a sa reputa-
tion. Toute personne a droit a la protection de la loi contre de telles immiztions out de
telles atteintes."). o
49. See European Convention, supra note 2.
50. See Leayla Linton, Diana's Death to Spur Media Curbs?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 22,
1997, at A18.
51. Id.
52. Id. This most recent attempt to quell the press is also probably due to the fact
that France has begun to recognize the rights of the press more in recent years. This shift
is in large part a result of the dictates of the European community, found in Article Ten of
the European Convention and the jurisprudence of the ECHR regarding the issue. See
discussion infra, Part III.C.
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in its history. It is only recently, through the weight of decisions by the
ECHR regarding privacy and the press, that French law has begun to
shift to a more balanced approach.
C. Origin of the Right to Privacy in Great Britain
The existence of a right to privacy in Great Britain is much more di-
luted than it is in France. In fact, prior to the integration of the European
Convention and the adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1998, Great
Britain did not recognize a right to privacy. 53 During that time, plaintiffs,
often famous public figures, had to rely on alternative methods for a le-
gal remedy.5 4 It was through this string of English case law that Justices
Warren and Brandeis formulated and extrapolated the "right to privacy"
in their famous law review article.55
However, the attempts of public figures to secure any right to pri-
vacy through these causes of action have proved largely futile. The legal
remedies found through such torts are not only difficult to prove,56 they
often do not provide a remedy adequate enough to merit suit.5 7 They do
demonstrate, however, the common law background of the eventual rec-
ognition of a right to privacy that took place in the late 1990s.
One of the most influential causes of action, heralded as the most
conducive to upholding privacy interests, is breach of confidence. 5' The
53. See Kaye v. Robertson and Another, 1991 E.S.R. 62 (C.A. 1990) (Only an act of
parliament can recognize the right of privacy because the English courts have denied it
for so long). Additionally, Parliament rejected recognizing an actual right to privacy in
British legislation up until the death of Princess Diana, when it decided to adopt the Con-
vention and also enact the Human Rights Act of 1998.
54. These causes of action include breach of confidence, passing off, trespass to
land, nuisance, and defamation. See discussion infra Part II.C. Although Warren and
Brandeis initially carved out the idea of a right to privacy from English case law dealing
primarily with these issues, these cases do not fully recognize a right to privacy. They
merely show the way plaintiffs attempted to seek a remedy for a breach of their privacy,
even though the right itself was not recognized by the courts.
55. See, Warren and Brandeis, supra note 6, at 204-10.
56. For example, the tort of trespass to land is extremely difficult to prove because
of zoom lenses and other technological devices that allow photographers to invade a ce-
lebrity's privacy without setting foot on his or her land. Thus, the celebrity can not prove
any damage or interference with his or her land, because the photographer must be on the
land of the plaintiff for the plaintiffs claim to succeed. See Lord Bernstein ofLeigh v.
Skyviews & General Ltd., 2 All E.R. 902, 1978 Q.B. 479 (1977) (photographs of plain-
tiffs property, taken from an airplane, did not meet the required showing for trespass).
57. In trespass, the remedy is typically only nominal damages, depending on the dif-
ference in the value of the land before and after the trespass. Such a remedy hardly war-
rants suit, especially considering how inadequate such a remedy is in comparison to the
breach that occurred. See Peter Kaye, AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO ENGLISH LAW OF
TORTS, 590-91 (1996).
58. See Kaye, supra note 57. Breach of confidence is not necessarily a tort, as the
law of confidence incorporates doctrines from contract and equity. However, it has
proven to be one of the best areas to protect privacy interests.
[Vol. 22:1
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courts suggested, primarily in dicta, that it was possible to limit and pos-
sibly punish the acts of the paparazzi through a breach of confidence
claim.5 9 A claim for a breach of confidence requires a showing of three
elements: (1) the information is confidential, usually shown when the
property is not public property or public knowledge; (2) the information
was disclosed in a confidential relationship, or under circumstances im-
plying such a relationship; and (3) the information was used by one
member of the confidential relationship without authority.60 In the case
of Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, 61 breach of confidence was used
to protect privacy interests.62 The court granted an injunction prohibiting
the Duke of Argyll and a newspaper from printing information the Duch-
ess had shared with the Duke while they were married.63
Although the case seemingly allowed for the protection of private
information under this cause of action, subsequent decisions sharply fo-
cused the holding, protecting only information shared in a confidential
relationship versus within the public domain.64 Thus, the requirement of
breaching a confidential relationship is very difficult to satisfy when
dealing with the paparazzi. It is especially difficult considering that most
of the time such actions are done with telephoto lenses, and the photog-
raphers seldom have any type of confidential relationship with the celeb-
rities they are shooting.
65
A second cause of action historically used to protect privacy inter-
ests was the common law tort of passing off. Passing off is a remedy for
the invasion of a property right in a business or goodwill.66 Thus, when a
newspaper or some other media outlet uses the goodwill of a certain ce-
lebrity's name or likeness to improve upon its business, that entity is
59. See Hellewell v. Chief Constable of Derbyshire, 1 W.L.R. 804 (Q.B.D. 1994). The
court stated in dicta that "if someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance
and with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent
disclose of the photograph would.. .amount to a breach of confidence." Id. at 807.
60. Raymond Whacks, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 31, 51-52
(1989).
61. Duchess ofArgyll v. Duke ofArgyll, 1967 Ch. 302 (1967).
62. Id. at 304-07.
63. Id. at 304-05.
64. The Argyll case can be better understood by looking at Woodward v. Hutchins 2
All E.R. 751 (Eng. C.A. 1997), which held that the information of certain public enter-
tainers that had been disclosed by a former employee was in the public domain, and thus
barring the granting of an injunction under breach of confidence. Id. at 756. It is possi-
ble that the discrepancy can be explained by the fact that marital intimacy is protected by
breach of confidence. See Francis Gibb, Princess Has Good Chance of Victory, Carter-
Ruck Says, TIMES (London), Nov. 9, 1993.
65. See Whacks, supra note 60, at 33. See also Patrick Milmo, Confidence and Pri-
vacy, NEW L.J., Nov. 19, 1993, at 1629.
66. Warnink v. Townend & Sons (Hull), 1 App. Cas. 731, 752 (1979). The Court
then defined "goodwill" as "the benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and
connection of a business, the attractive force which brings in custom." Id. at 741.
20031
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possibly invading a property right of the celebrity.67 A plaintiff must
show: 1) that a trader has made a misrepresentation to customers; 2) that
the misrepresentation is reasonably likely to injure the business or good-
will of another trader; and 3) that the misrepresentation does injure or
will injure that trader.68
The biggest problem celebrities faced in using this cause of action
was the element of actual damage to goodwill. The courts held that a
common field of activity between the parties is very important in proving
the claim. 69 In other words, if the parties were not competitors in the
same field of business, and confusion was unlikely, it was very difficult
to meet the elements of passing off.70 Additionally, it is also difficult for
celebrities to prove that they were traders, as required. In Kaye v.
Robertson,7 1 Mr. Kaye, who was an actor, suffered a severe injury and
was in the hospital. 72 While he was there, a reporter entered and inter-
viewed him and a photographer took pictures.73 The court held that he
was not a trader because he did not usually sell stories about himself and
his recovery.74 The trader requirement makes passing off a very difficult
claim to prove for a celebrity.
Another possible common law alternative for the right to privacy is
trespass to land. Again, trespass to land is very difficult in a paparazzi
situation because the celebrity must show that his or her land was in-
vaded and then damaged.75
Similarly, private nuisance is a difficult tort to use because it also
requires that a celebrity show an interest in the property that has been in-
vaded, and usually, a celebrity is photographed either in a public area or
from a distance outside of his or her land.76 It is also unlikely that a court
will sympathize with a celebrity's private nuisance claim if the circum-
stances show that he or she was in a public place.77
Finally, defamation is a common law tort that was used in an at-
tempt to protect the right to privacy. It, however, has also proven diffi-
67. See Kaye v. Robertson, supra note 53.
68. Warnink, supra note 66, at 742.
69. Harrods Ltd. V. Harrodian School Ltd., 1996 R.P.C. 697 (C.A. 1996).
70. Id




75. See supra notes 56, 57.
76. Hunter and Others v. Canary Wharf Ltd., 2 All E.R. 426 (H.L. 1997). Private
nuisance basically requires that the plaintiff own the land because the tort is directed
against the land or the enjoyment over the land. Id. at 435. If a celebrity does not have a
right to the land, which one seldom does, he or she cannot sue. Id. at 436.
77. St. Helen's Smelting Company v. Tipping, 11 H.L. Cas. 642, 649-51 (1865).
[Vol. 22:1
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cult to use, as illustrated in Kaye v. Robertson.78 In that case, the Court
denied Mr. Kaye's claim, stating that because it was not inevitable that a
jury would find libel, they could not grant an injunction.
7 9
D. British Legislation and Adoption of International Standards
1. Statutory Legislation. - Although the right to privacy was not ac-
tually recognized until the adoption of the European Convention and the
enactment of the Human Rights Act of 1998, Parliament made some
statutory attempts to afford protection to those whose privacy was being
invaded.80 In fact, several times over the last fifty years, Parliament con-
templated creating a right to privacy through statute.8' These proposed
bills never managed to create such a right, possibly due to Parliament's
fear of inhibiting the rights and freedoms of the press and also the pub-
lic's right to information.82 These proposals, however, did lay the foun-
dation for the adoption of such a right through the incorporation of inter-
national standards and the Human Rights Act of 1998.83
One statute that attempted to provide some relief for those whose
privacy was being invaded was the Protection from Harassment Act of
78. Kaye v. Robertson, supra note 53.
79. Id. at 67.
80. Although Parliament failed to create a statutory remedy for most public figures
dealing with the paparazzi, the Royal Family has made use of the 1956 Copyright Act.
Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74 (Eng.). This Act, in Section 39, is a narrow
statute that pertains only to the sovereign and the protection of her original work through
the granting of an intellectual property right over that work. However, this section still
only provides a limited remedy for invasions by the press.
81. See Patrick Wintour, Politics: Can Do, Will Do, OBSERVER (London), May 18,
1997, at 21.
82. See Alan Rusbridger & Gerald Kaufman, The Privacy Challenge, EVENING
STANDARD (London), July 30, 1997, at 51.
83. Parliament first introduced a bill regarding a right to privacy in 1969. The bill
addressed privacy invasions through "spying, prying, watching or besetting" and "unau-
thorized overhearing or recording." Wintour, supra note 81, at 21. It was denied for be-
ing over-broad, giving the courts too much latitude and the public too much of an outlet
for litigation.
Parliament then created a Committee on Privacy in 1970 to determine whether a
right to privacy was needed. John Wadham, Convention Dictates, GUARDIAN (London),
July 1, 1997, at 17. Although the Committee found that a right to privacy was "essential"
it still rejected endorsing the creation of such a right through legislation, fearing as Par-
liament did that it would be too broad.
In 1987 and 1988, more bills were proposed and rejected by Parliament regard-
ing the right to privacy. Id. Parliament at this time was worried about the competition
between such a right and the rights of the press. Id. In reaction to these denials, Parlia-
ment created another committee to deal with the right to privacy, the Calcutt Committee.
Id. This committee also did not endorse legislation, but instead focused on improving
press self-regulation. Id. It was not until after the death of Princess Diana that Parlia-
ment finally decided to adopt the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms and recognize a right to privacy.
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1997. 84 This act was designed to prohibit stalking, but it also has served
to protect those who are being harassed by intrusive reporters and other
such press.8 5 The Harassment Act provides that one "must not pursue a
course of conduct... if a reasonable person in possession of the same in-
formation would think the course of conduct amounted to harassment of
the other., 86 The statute also provides that harassment, or "conduct," in-
cludes speech.87 There are both civil and criminal remedies within the
Act, including civil damages, injunctions, restraining orders, and crimi-
nal sanctions for breaching such orders.88 However, the difficulty in us-
ing this Act as a method of protecting one's privacy interest is in the re-
quirement that conduct must be proven on two separate occasions.89
Obviously, the ability of the paparazzi to photograph celebrities at a dis-
tance makes it highly unlikely that a celebrity could prove a certain re-
porter or photographer twice breached the Act through such conduct.
90
2. Adoption of International Standards and The Human Rights
Act of 1998. - At long last, after the tragedy of Princess Diana, and the
public barrage of animosity toward the press, England did decide to in-
corporate the European Convention, specifically Article Eight, which
provides for a right to privacy. 91 It did so through the Human Rights Act
of 1998, which made the European Convention law in Great Britain.
92
84. Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, c. 40 (Eng.).
85. See Neil Addison & Tim Lawson-Cruddenden, How Can Victims Fight Back?,
TIMES (London), Sept. 9, 1997, at 33.
86. Protection from Harassment Act, supra note 84, at §§ l(1), 1(2).
87. Id. at § 7(2).
88. Section two (§ 2) states: "A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of
section I is guilty of a[n] [criminal] offense." Id. at § 2. Section three (§ 3) provides: "an
actual or apprehended breach of section I may be the subject of a claim in civil proceed-
ings by the person who is or may be the victim of the course of conduct in question." Id.
at § 3.
89. Section four (§ 4) states that "a person whose course of conduct causes another
to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against him is guilty of an
offence if he knows or ought to know that his course of conduct will cause the other so to
fear on each of those occasions." Id. at § 4(1).
90. See Marc P. Misthal, Reigning in the Paparazzi: The Human Rights Act, The
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Rights of
Privacy and Publicity in England, 10-Fall INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 287, 305 (1999).
91. European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 8. Article Eight, entitled the "right to
respect for private and family life," provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democ-
ratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.
92. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 1.(1) (Eng.). The Human Rights Act makes
Articles 2 through 12 and 14 of the Convention part of domestic English Law. Article
Eight, the Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, and Article Ten, The Freedom of
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The adoption of the Human Rights Act was the first true declaration of a
right to privacy in Great Britain, even though the doctrine had in some'
ways been developing through the common law and Parliament for over
fifty years.93
The British tradition and history regarding a right to privacy is
completely reversed from France's history regarding the right to privacy.
Where France had established the right to privacy early in its history and
developed the right through the incorporation of International Standards,
including the European Convention, Great Britain has only recently done
both. Thus, by looking at the European Convention and the impact it has
had on British and French law regarding privacy and freedom of the
press, one can see the convergence of two very differing legal traditions
in a specific area of law.
III. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
A. Background
The European Convention sets forth a number of fundamental rights
and freedoms that must be protected by all contracting States. 94 The goal
of the European Convention is "to protect, on an international level, hu-
man rights from violations by a State and to provide collective interna-
tional enforcement of these rights. 95 The European Convention, which
was signed in Rome on November 4, 1950,96 was a reaction to the lack of
protection of human rights during World War 11. 97 Each Member State
under the European Convention must secure these rights and freedoms to
everyone who comes within its jurisdiction.
98
Expression, are the most influential in the area of paparazzi control. The Act took effect
in January of 2000.
93. See supra Part II.C-D.
94. All 25 Member States of the Council of Europe are parties to The Convention.
These states include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech & Slovak F.R., Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom. See A.H. Robertson & J.G. Merrills, HUMAN RIGHTS 1N
EUROPE 413 (1993).
95. Sara Haenggi, The Right to Privacy is Coming to the United Kingdom: Balanc-
ing the Individual's Right to Privacy from the Press and the Media's Right to Freedom of
Expression, 21 Hous. J. INT'L L. 531, 536 (1999) (citing P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (1984)).
96. European Convention, supra note 2.
97. See van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 95, at 1.
98. The Convention, supra note 16, at art. 1. Unlike many international treaties, the
ECHR deals with the relationship between a state and an individual's rights within the
jurisdiction of that state. It is not a contract between states, but rather an agreement to
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The European Convention enforces the observance of the European
Convention through the ECHR.99 The ECHR is split into committees of
three judges, Chambers of seven judges, and a Grand Chamber of seven-
teen judges.1 °° When a case is brought to The ECHR, it first goes to a
committee, which determines whether the case is admissible. A commit-
tee may, through a unanimous vote, strike out a case if a decision can be
taken without further examination. 0 1 If such a decision is not made, the
case goes to a Chamber of seven judges, which also considers the admis-
sibility and merits of the case.'0 2 Finally, in exceptional cases,'0 3 the
Chamber may relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber. 10 4  The
Committee of Minsters, though not established by The European Con-
vention but rather by the Statute of the Council of Europe, 10 5 supervises
the execution of judgments 10 6 and may request that the ECHR give advi-
sory opinions concerning the interpretation of the European Convention
and its protocols.'07
B. Article Eight and Article Ten of the European Convention
The two articles that are most pertinent when discussing celebrities
and the paparazzi are Articles Eight and Ten of the European Conven-
tion. Article Eight specifically addresses the protection of an individ-
ual's private life.108 The concept of private life has been interpreted
broadly by the ECHR.' °9 The ECHR, through a variety of decisions, has
held that Article Eight encompasses business or professional activities,' 10
protect and individual's rights within a state, regardless of the individual's nationality.
See van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 95, at 3.
99. European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 19.
100. Id. at art. 27.
101. Id. at art. 28.
102. Id. at art. 29.
103. An exceptional case "raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the
Convention of protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Cham-
ber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court."
Id. at art. 30.
104. Id.
105. van Dijk & van Hoof, supra note 95, at 27.
106. European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20-57.
107. Id. at art. 47.
108. Id. at art. 8. See text accompanying note 77.
109. See Friedl v. Austria, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 83 (1995), which held that private life is
not "limited to an 'inner circle' in which the individual may live his own personal life as
he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within
this circle. Respect for human life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to es-
tablish and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world." Id. at
87.
110. See Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 111 (1992). The Court held that
because individuals can develop personal relationships while working, such activities
should be included within the right to privacy.
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the right to elect medical treatment,"' and phone tapping.' 12 However,
the rights under Article Eight do have some limitations, especially when
viewed in connection with other rights encompassed in the European
Convention." 3 In particular, when looking at the right to privacy when
celebrities are dealing with the paparazzi, it is vital that Article Eight be
considered in conjunction with Article Ten, which establishes freedom of
expression.
Article Ten of the ECHR protects an individual's right to express
himself or herself.1 14 In particular, it prohibits interference with an indi-
vidual's freedom to impart information without interference by a public
authority. 115 The right includes, although not categorically, court orders
demanding that an individual not impart information he possesses,1
6
court orders finding that the expression is defamatory," 17 and possibly
court orders finding that the expression unlawfully interferes with a per-
son's right to privacy. However, such situations are subject to the excep-
tions set forth in Article Ten, section two." 8
111. See Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 437, 471 (1992).
112. See Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1984) (notion of private
life in Article Eight includes telephone conversations); see also, e.g.; A v. France, 17 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 462 (1993) (Article Eight prohibits the recording of telephone conversations
when one or both parties has no knowledge of the recording); Kruslin v. France, 12 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 547 (1990) (telephone taps interfere with protected right under Article Eight);
Huvig v. France, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 528 (1990) (same).
113. A number of cases have limited the reach of the rights protected by Article
Eight. In Friedl v. Austria, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 83 (1995) the Court held that government
photographs taken in a public place are not an interference. Id. at 88. Additionally, the
Court reiterated that an interference may be justified if it is in accordance with the law,
has a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society. Id. at 89-91.
114. Article Ten of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms provides that:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideals
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article
shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television
or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since is carries with it duties and responsi-
bilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the inter-
ests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 16, at art. 10.
115. Id.
116. See Vereninging Weekbald Blufi v. The Netherlands, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 189
(1995); Jacubowski v. Germany, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 64 (1994).
117. Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442 (1995); Prager
and Oberschlick v. Austria, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995).
118. See European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10(2).
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The exceptions to the freedom of expression protected by Article
Ten must be construed narrowly.'1 19 Article Ten, section two sets out the
guidelines that the Court must use to determine whether a restriction on
an individual's freedom of expression is justified under the exceptions.
These guidelines are: 1) the restriction is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety; 120 2) the restriction is prescribed by law; 12' and 3) the restriction
meets one or more of the interests listed in Article Ten, section two, in-
cluding protecting "the reputation or rights of others" and "preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence."122 Thus, in order
for a celebrity to justify a restriction on the freedom of the press, he or
she must meet these guidelines so that the rights protected under Article
Ten are not unduly burdened.
C. French Incorporation of The European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
The impact of the European Convention in France has been signifi-
cant in changing the way French courts balance privacy rights against the
freedom of the press. 123 French adoption of the European Convention
has been influential in establishing both significant case law and legisla-
tion supporting the right to privacy. 124 Although France, at the time of
the European Convention's formation, already recognized a right to pri-
vacy through its case law, 125 the European Convention, signed in 1953,
and the 1948 Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Human Being
and the Citizen were the first documents to which France was a signatory
to and adopted, respectively, that asserted such a right. 126 It was not until
1970 that France codified the right to privacy in its own criminal and
civil codes. 12 7 This specific domestic incorporation of the right to pri-
vacy from French common law and the international treaties gave French
citizens specific statutory protection from invasion of their privacy.' 
28
The incorporation of the European Convention, although influential
in reaffirming "la vie privee,"'' 29 has had even more impact in protecting
119. Jersildv Denmark, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 14 (1994).
120. Id. "Necessary" means there must be a pressing social need for the restriction.
121. To be prescribed by law, the consequences of the restriction must be forseeable
to the individual, although it is not required that there be any degree of certainty in
forseeing the consequences. The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
245, 271 (1979).
122. See European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10(2).
123. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1284.
124. Logeais and Schroeder, supra note 20, at 513.
125. See discussion supra Part II.A.
126. Logeais and Schroeder, supra note 20, at 513.
127. C. civ. art. 9 (Fr.), C. PEN. art. 226 (Fr.).
128. Id.
129. See Huvig v. France; A v. France, supra note 112. In this case, the court held
[Vol. 22:1
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS
the freedom of the press. In recent years, there has been an increase in
the use of the ECHR as an additional and useful forum for those seeking
to protect their freedom of expression.'30 France's domestic law regard-
ing the press is quite stringent in comparison to the more broad and for-
giving law of the ECHR.13 1 Thus, as a result of the European Conven-
tion, individuals who feel that the French courts have allowed an
interference with their freedom in expression that did not meet the requi-
site justifications pursuant to Article Ten can take their claim to The
ECHR.
Three of the most recent and influential decisions of the ECHR re-
garding Article Ten in the past three years have, in fact, been from
France.132  This prolific use of the ECHR, considering the severely
slowed pace of the court and the low number of Article Ten cases it de-
cides each year, is indicative of the influence the European Convention
has had on French law in regard to the press.
Additionally, recent cases within France are suggesting that French
courts, even under the current legislation, are shifting the balance from
protecting privacy to protecting the press. 33 In the affair of The Bones
of Dionysis,134 decided in 1989, the Cour de cassation implicitly recog-
nized the limits Article Ten may put on protecting privacy interests.,
3 5
The court held that an injunction banning a novel that allegedly harmed
the reputation of certain individuals was an unjustified restriction under
Article Ten. 136 The court relied only on the dictates of the European
that phone tapping was an impermissible interference with one's right to privacy. The
court's determination grew out of French cases that were taken to the ECHR and argued
via Article Eight of the European Convention.
130. See, e.g.; Lehideux & Isorni v. France, 30 Eur. H. R. Rep. 665 (2000); Fressoz
& Roire v. France, 31 Eur. H. R. Rep. 2 (2001); Du Roy & Malaurie v. France, (2000),
available at www.echr.coe.int/eng.
131. As stated in Section II(A) of this article, the law regarding the right to privacy in
France is quite developed. Although pictures taken in public and public knowledge is
printable by the press, French citizens do have a variety of options, through common law
torts, the criminal code and the civil code, in protecting their privacy. See supra Part
II.A.
132. Lehideux, supra note 130 (finding that the conviction of journalists who pub-
lished an advertisement about Marshal Petain was a violation of Article 10); Fressoz, su-
pra note 130 (conviction of journalists for publishing extracts from tax-assessment forms
was a violation of Article Ten); Du Roy, supra note 130.
133. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1284.
134. Judgment of Jan. 31, 1989, Cass. Civ. Ire, LEXIS Pourvoi No. 87-15.139.
135. See Hauch, supra note 7, at 1284.
136. Id. at 1286. The Cour de cassation found that, under Article Ten, the lower court
judges were bound to apply the standards of the rule of law for such seizures and, "in ex-
tending to all French territory a preliminary seizure designed to protect some individuals
living in the Hautes-Pyrenees [a sparsely populated area north of the Spanish border],
without explaining how this measure was necessary to redress the violation, the court of
appeals violated Article Ten."
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Convention in deciding the case, dramatically changing the way French
courts balance the right to privacy and freedom of expression.' 37
The impact of the European Convention has been significant in
France, especially in the expansion of the law regarding freedom of ex-
pression. This is the opposite from the situation in England, where the
European Convention has made drastic changes in promoting privacy
law. The incorporation of the European Convention in Great Britain has
caused the courts to shift to a more balanced approach in regard to pri-
vacy interests versus freedom of the press.
D. British Incorporation of The European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
English law was dramatically altered by the formal adoption of the
European Convention through the Human Rights Act of 1998.138 Prior to
1998, the only outlet a British citizen had to protect his or her privacy
right was through the European Convention itself, by applying to the
ECHR to have his or her case heard.139 Unlike France, England's lack of
any common law right to privacy forced citizens to use international trea-
ties as an enforcement mechanism rather than their own domestic
courts. 140
137. Although it was once thought that the court's reliance on Article Ten of the
European Convention would not continue, the case law that followed has not been as
staunchly in favor of privacy rights over those of the press. See T.G.I. Paris, 17e ch.,
Mar. 6, 1997, Correct. At 133 (Prince Ranier I1 v. Voici). The court held that the actions
of the managers of Voici, a popular French tabloid, were acceptable because "the conten-
tious photograph displayed in an obvious manner the features of a fabricated editing and
that the layman reader of Voici magazine would not be mistaken with the use of such a
device."
138. The pertinent parts of Section 12 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 are as fol-
lows:
(1) This section applies if the court is considering whether to grant any relief
which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom
of expression.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial
unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publica-
tion should not be allowed.
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention
right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material
which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic,
literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to-
(a) the extent to which-
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code."
Human Rights Act, supra note 92, at art. 12.
139. Haenggi, supra note 95, at 534.
140. Attempts to incorporate the European Convention into domestic law were made
for over thirty years, unsuccessfully, until the Human Rights Act of 1998. the success of
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Since the adoption of the Human Rights Act, there has been a sig-
nificant amount of British case law regarding the right to privacy and
freedom of expression, respectively.1 41 The courts have, through these
cases, established a theory that attempts to balance both rights in situa-
tions where, allegedly, an individual's privacy is being interfered with by
a press publication.1 42 The common law elements showing a breach of
confidence have been extended to encompass Articles Eight and Ten of
the European Convention pursuant to the Human Rights Act, 143 and in so
doing, celebrities have had a more forgiving theory of relief than they
had prior to 1998.144
Although most courts still tip the scales toward protecting freedom
of expression, some recent decisions of English domestic courts have
incorporation came with the Labour government headed by Tony Blair, who actively
worked to adopt the European Convention as part of his constitutional program. Id. The
Conservative Party administrations under Thatcher and Major felt that incorporation
would give judges too much power. See Frances Gibb, Peer's Efforts Bear Fruit After 30
Years, TIMES (London), July 5, 1997, at 7.
141. "Since the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998.. .there has been an
increase in the number of actions in which injunctions are being sought to protect the
claimants from the publication of articles in newspapers on the grounds that the articles
contain confidential information concerning the claimants, the publication of which, it is
alleged, would infringe their privacy."
B & C v. A 2 All E.R. 545 (C.A. 2002). See, also, e.g.; Australian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration v. Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd. 2001 H.C.A. 63 (2001); Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.
2001 Q.B. 967 (2001); Venables v. Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd [2001] Fam 430 (2001);
Imutran Ltd. v. Uncaged Campaigns Ltd. 2002 F.S.R. 20 (2002); Theakston v. MGM Ltd.
2002 EWHC 137 (Q.B.D. 2002).
142. B & C v. A, supra note 141. This case involved a premier footballer who was
attempting to get an injunction to stop publication of his infidelities, as told by the
woman with whom he had an affair. In this recent decision, the Court went through the
history of the "breach of confidence" claim, the changes in the law since the adoption of
the Human Rights Act, and the guidelines that English domestic courts should follow in
making determinations in similar situations under the Human Rights Act.
143. Id. at 707-08. However, the courts have refused to create a new privacy tort in
response to the Human Rights Act. Theakston v. MGN Limited, supra note 141, at 414.
144. An example of this expansion of "breach of confidence" is described in B & C v.
A, supra note 141.
"The applications for interim injunctions have now to be considered in the con-
text of Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. These
Articles have provided new parameters within which the court will decide, in
an action for breach of confidence, whether a person is entitled to have his pri-
vacy protected by the court or whether the restriction of freedom of expression
which such protection involves cannot be justified. The court's approach to the
issues which the applications raise has been modified because under section 6
of the 1998 Act, the court, as a public authority, is required not to act "in a way
which is incompatible with a Convention right". The court is able to achieve
this by absorbing the rights which Articles 8 and 10 protect into the long-
established action for breach of confidence. This involves giving a new
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given more weight to the right to privacy when balancing that right
against the freedom of the press.1 45 Because Article Ten, section two al-
lows only for a narrow justification to an interference with freedom of
expression, England has in large part been able to maintain the traditional
British notion of protecting the freedom of the press, especially when
dealing with celebrities.1 46 However, the importance of the European
Convention in Great Britain cannot be overstated, for without its incor-
poration, England would not even recognize a right to privacy at all.
The recognition of a right to privacy in Britain has significantly
changed the nature of litigation regarding acts of the paparazzi and al-
lowed for celebrities to have a more defined justification against such in-
vasions into their personal lives. Although the English courts have skill-
fully adapted this recognition into the basic and well-developed common
law tort, breach of confidence, the Human Rights Act has still had a tre-
mendous impact. The incorporation of the European Convention forces
British courts to balance freedom of the press against the right to privacy,
thus changing how British courts must decide cases involving celebrities
and the press. 147
IV. Conclusion
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was a significant document in the evolution of
privacy law in both France and Great Britain.1 48 Its incorporation put
forth two rights that, while both being equally fundamental and vital in
the recognition of human rights, are often at odds with each other.
1 49
This dichotomy is never more clear than in situations dealing with the
freedom of the press and the privacy rights of individuals, especially ce-
lebrities.
In France, the recognition of these rights, especially the right to pri-
vacy, was not a new occurrence. 150 In fact, both rights were well estab-
lished through the French common law tradition, as well as codified in
its legislation.151 However, the incorporation of Article Ten changed the
145. See generally, Douglas v, Hello! Ltd., supra note 141; B & C v. A, supra note
141; Venables v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., supra note 141.
146. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, supra note 121, in which the ECHR said
that the Court in deciding whether a given interference with free expression was neces-
sary in a democratic society "is faced not with a choice between two conflicting princi-
ples, but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of excep-
tions which must be narrowly interpreted". Id. at 65.
147. See Douglas, supra note 141; B & C v, A, supra note 141, Venables, supra note
141.
148. See supra Parts II1.C., III.D.
149. See European Convention, supra note 2, at art. 8, 10.
150. See supra Part II.A.
151. See supra Part II.A-C.
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way the French courts balance the two rights. As a result, the French
courts are giving more weight to freedom of expression in deciding
claims based on privacy and press laws.
152
Additionally, the European Convention has given French citizens
another outlet by which to take their claims, either under Article Eight or
Article Ten. Because France has traditionally had a very stringent policy
against the press and paparazzi, the ECHR, which tends to give a more
lenient view toward freedom of expression, serves as an additional
mechanism through which the press may find relief.
15 3
The story in England was and is very different. The recent devel-
opments in privacy law following the 1998 incorporation of the Euro-
pean Convention through the Human Rights Act have been signifi-
cant. 1 54 Celebrities especially, who traditionally did not have a strong
common law basis on which to rely in fighting interference with their
privacy by the press, now have the strength of Article Eight to back up
their claims. 55 Although the traditional leniency toward protecting the
press in England still pervades, it is a much more difficult task now that
Article Eight of the European Convention must be recognized by the
courts.
The influence of The European Convention is obvious and signifi-
cant in both England and France, although each country's development
of privacy law, especially in relation to freedom of expression, has been
quite different. However, even though each country came from opposite
ends of the spectrum regarding privacy and freedom of the press, the end
result in regard to this area of the law is relatively similar. Through the
incorporation of the European Convention, both countries have grown
closer in the way they balance the right to privacy against freedom of ex-
pression. While France has become more lenient toward the press in re-
cent years, primarily through decisions of the ECHR, England has taken
dramatic steps toward recognizing a right to privacy and cutting back in
their protection of the press. Thus, through the long and steady devel-
opment of the law in France and the recent rapid changes and adaptations
of the law in England, both countries are surprisingly nearing a consen-
sus.
152. See supra Part III.C.
153. Id.
154. See supra Part III.D.
155. Id.
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